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Understanding RPKI Routing: Enhancing Internet Security by Using MikroTik RouterOSv7

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## Hello, I am Michael Takeuchi

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## How was the Internet built?

## Yes, it was done by **BGP Routing!**

## **Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)**

BGP is crucial for the proper functioning of the Internet, is used to exchange routing and reachability information between different autonomous systems (AS) on the Internet.

An autonomous system is a collection of IP networks and routers under the control of a single organization that presents a common routing policy to the Internet.

#### How BGP formed the Internet – <u>bgp.he.net</u>

AS141137 IPv4 Route Propagation



Each AS Number will advertise their networks



# How we can **verify** the prefix advertisement?

## **Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)**

also known as Resource Certification, is a specialized public key infrastructure (PKI) framework to support <u>improved security</u> for the Internet's <u>BGP routing</u> infrastructure.

RPKI provides a way to connect Internet number <u>resource</u> <u>information</u> (such as Autonomous System numbers and IP addresses) to a trust anchor.

## The Architecture



#### VRP = Validated Payload

## BGP Advertisement with RPKI



The Prefix will be validated through the validator server and the TAL (Trust Anchor Locator)

## Step by Step to Integrate with RouterOS



## **RPKI Release Note**

RouterOS version 7.0beta8 has been released in public "development" channel!

What's new in 7.0beta8 (2020-Jun-4 15:04):

\*) fixed CLI dependencies for routing menu;

#### What's new in 7.0beta7 (2020-Jun-3 16:31):

!) added Layer3 hardware offloading support for CRS317-1G-16S+RM more info here: <u>https://wiki.mikrotik.com/wiki/Manual:C</u> ... Offloading
!) enabled BGP support with multicore peer processing (CLI only);
!) enabled RPKI support (CLI only);
!) ported features and fixes introduced in v6.47;
!) routing updates, complete status report: <u>https://help.mikrotik.com/docs/display/ ... col+Status</u>
!) system kernel has been updated to version 5.6.3;
\*) other minor fixes and improvements;

## Setup the Validator





**OctoRPKI** 

Can be installed in your Linux/UNIX server or any supported platform (need to check one by one)



## Setup the Validator – Routinator (example)

We can easily deploy the routinator using docker container (Linux Based)

```
sudo docker run -d --restart=unless-stopped --name routinator \
    -p 3323:3323 \
    -p 8323:8323 \
    nlnetlabs/routinator
```

Or you can also deploy the routinator directly to your system :)

More info, <a href="https://routinator.docs.nlnetlabs.nl/en/stable/installation.html">https://routinator.docs.nlnetlabs.nl/en/stable/installation.html</a>

## Setup in RouterOS

# /routing/rpki add address=\$YOUR VALIDATOR SERVER IP ADDR disabled=no group=myRPKI port=3323

## Setup in RouterOS

/routing/rpki rpki-check origin-as=141137
prefix=103.158.252.0/23 group=myRPKI

valid

/routing/rpki rpki-check origin-as=141138
prefix=103.158.252.0/23 group=myRPKI
invalid

## Setup in RouterOS

- valid database has a record and origin AS is valid.
- invalid the database has a record and origin AS is invalid.
- unknown database does not have information of prefix and origin AS.
- **unverified** set when none of the RPKI sessions of the RPKI group has synced database. This value can be used to handle the total failure of the RPKI.

## Apply the Routing Filter

/routing/filter/rule

add chain=bgp\_in rule="rpki-verify myRPKI"

add chain=bgp\_in rule="if (rpki invalid) { reject } else { accept }"

In this case, I will totally reject the prefix, but you can also choose to reject or decrease the BGP local preference, or do anything else that you want.

## Test & Monitoring – isbgpsafeyet.com



## And also, do not forget to create the RPKI ROA for your own prefix to avoid BGP hijacking within your own network :)

## **RPKI Check**

DUDFLARE Explore the F	Routing Security ecosystem		
( Statistics	Route Validator	BGP Routes	Resource Explorer
3GP Routes		Enter an IP prefix Exact Only Less Specific	ROA VALIDATION: More Specific All Valid Invalid Non-
		Valid 100%	
ASN	Prefix		ROA
<b>ASN</b> AS141137	Prefix           2406:c640::/32	100%	ROA ✓ Valid
		100%	
AS141137	2406:c640::/32	100% IP Family IPv6	√ Valid

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## Thanks!:)